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1 The inter-war years were not the happiest time for the French Gendarmerie nationale.
Many gendarmes still felt frustrated that, for the first time in the history of their force,
they had not been able to send a military unit of their own to the front during the First
World War. Rather, they had become the butt of jokes among the poilus, notably with
comments such as : “The front ends where you meet the first gendarme.” But for the
men posted to Corsica in the inter-war period, frustration and embarrassment about
the Gendarmerie’s role in the war were the least of their worries. The institution still
carried the image of the debonair, moustachioed, loyal, although not terribly bright,
Pandore from Third Republic, which might have softened some post-war criticism, but
this was largely on the mainland.
2 Corsica was characterised romantically as “un pays des montagnes dans la mer”, but
for many gendarmes posted to the island from the mainland it appeared as bad, if not
worse, than some of the grimmer colonial postings. The land and the people were poor,
and the people commonly looked on outsiders with suspicion. The cost of living was
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high, and the locals were happy to fleece gendarmes as well  as any other outsiders.
Transport links were tenuous, especially in the more mountainous districts. Malaria
was rampant ;  and there were the bandits.  It  was partly as a  result  of  an apparent
increase  in  banditry  that,  in  1927,  the  XVth Legion  of  the  Gendarmerie,  based  in
Marseilles, had part of its compliment separated off as an autonomous company to be
situated in Corsica.  This company consisted of 635 men, twice the size of a normal
departmental  company,  together  with  other  police  institutions,  including  from
late1931  some  600  gardes  républicains  mobiles.  This  made  Corsica  the  most  heavily
policed region of France. The compagnie autonome de la Corse and its myriad difficulties
are the subjects of Simon Fieschi’s well-researched and lively monograph.
3 Fieschi’s book, which draws heavily on the fragmentary records of the company that
survive in the Service historique de la Défense,  is divided into three sections. The first
discusses the Gendarmerie Company in Corsica. There were difficulties in getting men to
serve on the island because of the problems. There was supposed to be around two
Corsican gendarmes in each local brigade of roughly six men to help with the language
and customs ;  however they were often not too keen on the place.  Incentives were
offered, such as faster promotion and service on the island counting double towards a
man’s pension ; but men still tried every way to get back to the mainland. They also lied
about doing their ordinary daily service ; they got drunk ; they beat up their women
and they amassed large debts.  The implication here is  that  such behaviour was far
worse than on the mainland – and perhaps in many parts of the French Empire. Yet
more work probably needs to be done to see if this was indeed the case. Much of the
men’s  dissatisfaction  appears  to  have  been  related  directly  to  the  attitudes  of  the
islanders towards them and the general relationship between gendarmes and Corsicans.
This is the subject of the second section of the book. “Nous sommes en Corse”, noted Lt.
Col. Delavallade, the company commander from 1929 to 1931, “où le principe fait loi :
‘Tous ceux qui  ne sont pas du clan sont  ennemis’”.  The small  Gendarmerie brigades
found themselves pressured to support influential clans during elections ; individual
gendarmes, especially NCOs, could be victimised by such clans. Equally difficult was the
fact  that  all  the  men on the  island carried  firearms.  The  gendarmes generally  used
discretion in enforcing the law against carrying guns, but on occasions – when someone
was shot – they had to get involved ;  and here they came up against another local
problem. Vendetta and blood feuds were still a part of Corsican life. Given his way of
life  the  bandit  André  Spada  may  not  have  been  entirely  typical  of  the  island
population ; but when he declared that he was “un criminel mais non pas un voleur” he
was playing up to the Corsican traditions of banditry and violence.
4 Spada, like most of the bandits described by Fieschi, was a nasty individual. Whatever
their boasts, these men of honour robbed as well as murdered ; they also indulged in
fraud  and  protection  rackets.  They  were  cocky  enough  to  write  threats  to
representatives  of  the  government.  They  exploited  the  heroic  image  of  the  bandit
d’honneur to win sympathy from the local population ; but whenever and where that
sympathy faltered they turned to terror and violence. They revelled in opportunities to
humiliate  gendarmes,  and  isolated  Gendarmerie brigades  often  preferred  not  to  get
involved and not to go out of their way to confront them. The third section of the book
chronicles the way in which the Gendarmerie approached the problem of the bandits
and, particularly, the military campaign that was launched against them in November
1931. This campaign appears something akin to a sweep against insurgents in a colonial
possession after the Second World War. As well as the 600 gardes républicains mobiles the
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gendarmes were  equipped  with  machine-guns  and  were  able  to  call  on  armoured
vehicles. In addition they were given leeway to pressurise the families and friends of
bandits  so  as  to  ‘persuade’  them to surrender.  Unsurprisingly,  perhaps,  there were
frictions between the different police institutions involved in the campaign as they vied
for the credit, and the rewards, in various captures.
5 Fieschi has a fascinating story to tell,  and he tells it  well.  He carefully sets out the
sources  for  his  work  in  an  introductory  chapter,  but  thereafter,  unfortunately,
scholarly apparatus is put to one side. Most seriously, there is no index. Although it is
possible  for  readers  to  find  their  way  to  broad  topics,  thanks  to  well-signposted
chapters and subdivisions, there is no way easily to find references to individuals like
Spada,  or  like  François  Bornea,  a  former gendarme who became a bandit.  Similarly,
while the principle Gendarmerie documents are discussed in general terms, they are not
cited in footnotes so the reader is left to guess where particular quotations may be
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